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We propose a secure watermarking scheme that integrates watermarking with cryptography for addressing some important issues
in copyright protection. We address three copyright protection issues—buyer-seller identification, copyright infringement, and
ownership verification. By buyer-seller identification, we mean that a successful watermark extraction at the buyer’s end will reveal
the identities of the buyer and seller of the watermarked image. For copyright infringement, our proposed scheme enables the
seller to identify the specific buyer from whom an illegal copy of the watermarked image has originated, and further prove this fact
to a third party. For multiple ownership claims, our scheme enables a legal seller to claim his/her ownership in the court of law.
We will show that the combination of cryptography with watermarking not only increases the security of the overall scheme, but
it also enables to associate identities of buyer/seller with their respective watermarked images.
Copyright © 2006 Hindawi Publishing Corporation. All rights reserved.
1. INTRODUCTION
With rapid growth of the Internet, security of digital images
is becoming a great concern. It has now become very easy to
illegally copy, modify, and retransmit a digital image. Digi-
tal watermarking is a technique that provides a way to pro-
tect digital images from illicit copying and manipulation. A
digital watermark is an imperceptible signal added to digi-
tal data, called cover work, which can be detected later for
buyer/seller identification, ownership proof, and so forth [1].
A digital watermarking scheme can either be symmetric or
asymmetric. A symmetric watermarking scheme uses iden-
tical keys for watermark embedding and detection [2]. This
possesses a security weakness as the information used to de-
tect a watermark can be used to remove it. This restricts the
use of symmetric watermarking, as the number of authorized
detectors has to be strictly controlled. To solve this problem,
asymmetric watermarking schemes have been proposed that
use diﬀerent keys for watermark embedding and detection
[3–6]. This makes the use of watermarking possible for pub-
lic domain applications where any one with the detection key
can check the embedded watermark. However, the practical
use of asymmetric watermarking requires careful considera-
tions [7]. It is worth noting that merely using a watermark-
ing algorithm does not completely address the issues of copy-
right protection. To devise a secure watermarking scheme, it
is necessary that a watermarking algorithm is well integrated
with a secure protocol [8, 9]. For example, in [10], an inter-
active buyer-seller protocol is proposed that prevents a seller
from knowing the exact watermarked copy he/she creates for
a buyer. Therefore, the seller cannot create copies of the orig-
inal content that contains the buyer’s watermark. The proto-
col further allows the seller to identify a buyer from whom
an unauthorized copy has originated and prove this fact to a
third party.
Our primary aim in this paper is to devise cryptographic
protocols and integrate them with some of the existing wa-
termarking techniques in order to address the issues related
to buyer/seller identification and copyright protection. To
further elaborate our motivation, we present a few scenar-
ios. Suppose Alice sells a watermarked image to Bob. Later
in time, Bob starts selling Alice’s watermarked image using
his fake watermarks. How will Alice prevent Bob from doing
this? If the watermarked image consists of both Alice’s and
Bob’s watermarks, how will the actual owner (Alice) be iden-
tified? If Bob somehow removes Alice’s watermark from the
image in dispute, is there any way for Alice to claim her gen-
uine ownership? Consider another scenario. Alice wants to
sell a watermarked image Iw to Bob such that the extraction
of the watermark from Iw is a legal proof that Bob has indeed
purchased Iw from Alice. How will such a watermark be de-
signed whose extraction reveals identities of the buyer/seller?
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In this paper, we will show that the combination of cryptog-
raphy with watermarking not only increases the security of
the overall scheme but it also enables to associate identities
of the buyer/seller with their respective watermarked images.
Specifically, we will focus on three issues of copyright protec-
tion, that is, buyer-seller identification, copyright infringe-
ment, and verification of ownership. By buyer-seller identifi-
cation, wemean that a successful watermark extraction at the
buyer’s end will reveal the identities of the buyer and seller of
the watermarked image. In case of copyright infringement
from a buyer, the proposed scheme enables the seller to iden-
tify the specific buyer from whom an illegal copy of a wa-
termarked image has originated, and further prove this fact
to a third party. By ownership verification, we mean that the
seller of a watermarked image should be able to prove his/her
legal ownership in case of multiple ownership claims.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of some of the terminologies used in
this paper and describes certain assumptions. In Sections 3
and 4, we describe the watermark embedding and extrac-
tion processes, respectively. In Sections 5 and 6, we present
details of the copyright protection protocols. Section 7 con-
cludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Before we describe our watermarking scheme and related
protocols, we give an overview of some of the terminologies
and describe certain assumptions made in the paper. We as-
sume that there exists a certification trusted authority (CTA)
whose purpose is to generate watermarks and issue them to
any user upon request. The CTA is memory-less and does
not keep a track record of the watermarks issued to diﬀerent
users. At any instant in time, the CTA can issue watermarks
to a single seller. It is further assumed that each time a seller
requests for watermarks, the CTA issues unique watermarks.
We represent the seller of a watermarked image as Alice. For
encryption/decryption and digital signatures, we use the RSA
public key cryptosystem [11]. We denote encryption and de-
cryption with the functions EK (·) and DK (·), respectively.
The subscript K is used to represent the cryptographic key
used for encryption/decryption. For the purpose of illustra-
tion, assume (KCpub, KCpri) to be the respective public and




A ) be the respective
public and private key pair of Alice. We represent digital sig-
nature by the function SS(·). The subscript S represents the
signer’s identity. For example, for amessageX , the digital sig-
nature of the CTA will be represented by SC(X). We now give
a brief overview of hash function, digital signature, and blind
source separation.
2.1. Hash function
Suppose a message is to be sent that contains “p′′ symbols
and we would like to reduce the length of the message to say
“k′′ symbols. A cryptographic hash function [12]H(x) maps
the set of “p′′ symbols to a set of “k′′ symbols if H(x) is easy
to compute from x, however,
(i) it is computationally diﬃcult to find two diﬀerent val-
ues of x that gives the same H(x), that is, a hash func-
tion is collision free;
(ii) given y in the image of H(·), no one can feasibly find
an x such that H(x) = y, that is, a hash function is
preimage resistant.
There are a number of hash functions proposed in the
literature. The two famous ones are SHA and MD5 that give
160-bit and 128-bit hash values, respectively, for any length
of a message [13]. Hash functions are also called message-
digest algorithms.
2.2. Digital signature
A digital signature of a message is a number dependent on
some secret known only to the signer, and additionally on
the content of the message being signed. It provides a way to
protect the integrity of a digital document and to verify who
signed it. One way to implement a digital signature scheme
is to use a one-way hash function and the RSA public key
cryptosystem [14].
2.2.1. Signature generation
Suppose Alice wants to send a digitally signed message m to
Bob. Alice will calculate the digital signature as follows.
(i) Transform the messagem to a message digest H(m).
(ii) Encrypt H(m) with her private key to get the digital
signature SA(m) : SA(m) = EKpriA (H(m)).
(iii) Send the pair [m, SA(m)] to Bob.
2.2.2. Signature verification
At the receiving end, Bob will verify Alice’s signature as fol-
lows.
(i) Decrypt SA(m) with Alice’s public key to obtainH(m) :
H(m) = DKpubA (SA(m)).
(ii) Compute the hash H(m) of the message m (for the
purpose of clarity, the notation H(X) is used in the
signature verification stage to represent the computed
hash of a message X).
(iii) If H(m) = H(m), the signature will be considered
valid.
2.3. Blind source separation using independent
component analysis
Independent component analysis (ICA) is probably the most
widely used method for performing blind source separation
(BSS). It is a very general-purpose statistical technique to
recover the independent sources given only sensor observa-
tions that are linear mixtures of independent source signals
[15, 16]. ICA model consists of two parts: the mixing pro-
cess and the unmixing process. In the mixing process, the ob-
served linearmixtures x1, . . . , xm of n number of independent















Figure 1: Block diagram of watermark embedding.
components are defined as
xj = aj1s1 + aj2s2 + · · · + ajnsn, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, (1)
where {sk, k = 1, . . . ,n} denote the source variables, that is,
the independent components, and {ajk, j = 1, . . . ,m; k =
1, . . . ,n} are the mixing coeﬃcients. In vector-matrix form,
the above mixing model can be expressed as
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is the mixing matrix, x = [x1x2 · · · xm]T , s = [s1s2 · · · sn]T ,
and T is the transpose operator. The unmixing process
[15, 16] can be formulated by computing the separa-
tion/unmixing matrix Q so that the independent compo-
nents can be obtained as
s = Qx. (4)
The simplest BSS model assumes that there is the same num-
ber of linear mixtures as the independent components or
sources. The objective of BSS is to find a linear representation
in which the components are statistically independent. For
performing BSS, techniques such as principal component
analysis (PCA) [17] are not feasible as they give components
that are uncorrelated. However, there are many uncorrelated
representations of signals that are actually not independent.
As amatter of fact, independence is amuch stronger property
than uncorrelatedness. Independence implies uncorrelated-
ness, however, the opposite is not true. The goal of ICA is
much broader than PCA as it gives components that are not
only uncorrelated but statistically independent as well. This
makes ICA suitable for performing BSS. It is to be noted that
for the ICA model in (2), two major ambiguities exist. The
first ambiguity is that we cannot determine the variances or
energies of the extracted independent components as both
the mixing matrix and the original independent components
are unknown. This may also create ambiguity in the sign of
the extracted components. The second ambiguity is that we
cannot determine the original order of the independent com-
ponents as both the mixing matrix and the original indepen-
dent components are unknown. In Section 4, we will show
how these ambiguities are addressed in our watermarking
scheme.
The use of ICA in watermarking application is not new.
Noel and Szu [18] were among the first to introduce ICA
in watermarking application. Likewise, Yu and Sattar [19]
have proposed a blind watermarking technique using ICA.
In this paper, we have used ICA for extracting the public wa-
termark from the watermarked image. The basic idea behind
our work is to use some specific image pattern as the public
watermark, for example, see Figure 2. In Sections 4 and 5, we
demonstrate how such patterns can be used within a cryp-
tographic framework to represent the identities of the buyer
and seller of a watermarked image. The image to be water-
marked is linearly mixed with the public watermark to get
the watermarked image. Hence, watermark extraction can
be viewed as a blind source separation problem. To perform
BSS, we have used ICA to extract the public watermark from
the watermarked image.
3. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
In this section, we describe the procedure for watermark em-
bedding. Let the seller’s original image be denoted by I and
the watermarked image by Iw. To address buyer-seller identi-
fication and copyright protection, our proposed watermark-
ing scheme uses two diﬀerent watermarks. The first water-
mark is used to reveal the identity of the buyer and seller
of the watermarked image. We name this watermark as the
public watermark Wpub. The second watermark serves two
purposes. Firstly, it enables a legal seller to prove his/her
ownership in case of multiple ownership claims. Secondly,
in case of copyright infringement by a buyer, the extraction
of this watermark will enable the seller to identify the mali-
cious buyer from whom an illegal copy of the watermarked
image has originated and further prove this fact to a third
party. We call this watermark as the private watermark Wpri.
Figure 1 shows the block diagram for watermark embedding.
The private watermark Wpri is first embedded into the orig-
inal image I to get an intermediate-watermarked image I∗.
The image I∗ is then further watermarked with the public
watermark Wpub to get the final watermarked image Iw and
the public-watermark key. We will show in the watermark
extraction procedure that embedding the public watermark
after embedding the private does not have any significant
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degradation on the private-watermark extraction. In the fol-
lowing sections, we present the details of private- and public-
watermark embedding.
3.1. Private-watermark embedding
The private watermark is required to be very robust because
of three main reasons. Firstly, it is used to resolve copyright
infringement andmultiple ownership claims. Secondly, since
the public watermark is embedded after embedding the pri-
vate watermark, the private watermark should withstand the
distortions introduced due to public-watermark embedding.
The third reason for the private watermark to be robust is
because it is the only means through which a genuine owner
can prove his/her ownership in case the public watermark
is destroyed. As Mintzer and Braudaway [20] have pointed
out, in case of multiple watermark embedding, diﬀerent wa-
termarks might have diﬀerent robustness requirements. Sec-
ondly, the order of embedding the watermarks is also very
important. Mintzer and Braudaway suggest that the owner-
ship watermark should be themost robust and should be em-
bedded first; the most fragile watermark should be embed-
ded last, while moderately robust watermark(s) should be
inserted in between. For successful multiple watermark em-
bedding, the robust watermark that is embedded first should
be able to withstand all the subsequent watermark insertions
[20]. In our work, since the private watermark is the most
important, it is embedded first which is then followed by
public-watermark embedding.We have used the spread spec-
trum watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [2] to
embed the private watermark. This technique is very robust
against a number of attacks as discussed in [2]. In addition,
the watermark pattern can be detected even if an image is
watermarked multiple number of times.
The private watermark Wpri is a sequence of real num-
bers:
Wpri = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn
}
, (5)
where eachwi is chosen independently according to a normal
distribution with zero mean and unit variance. The DCT of
the original image I is taken and the watermark sequence wi
is embedded in the 1000 (N=1000) highest-valued AC coef-






where zi is the ith highest-valued AC DCT coeﬃcient of I
and α1 controls the strength of the watermark. The modified
DCT coeﬃcients ẑi are then inserted back in place of zi and
an inverse DCT is taken to get the intermediate-watermarked
image I∗.
3.2. Public-watermark embedding
The purpose of embedding the public watermark is to enable
anyone with the knowledge of the public-watermark key to
extract the public watermark. The public watermark is used
to identify the buyer and seller of the watermarked image.
Figure 2: Public watermark.
An important question that arises is how to design a pub-
lic watermark that can be associated with some information.
For example, if the public watermark is required to reveal
the identities of the buyer and seller of a watermarked im-
age, how can this be achieved? We address this issue by us-
ing a watermark that portrays the hash of the information
that is required to be associated with the watermark. Some
commonly used hash functions are MD5 and SHA1 that give
128-bit and 160-bit hash values, respectively [14]. Suppose
M is a piece of information that uniquely identifies the buyer
and seller of a watermarked image. In our proposed scheme,
we use the public keys of the buyer and seller for identifi-
cation purpose. It should be noted that in a real-world sce-
nario, public keys are certified by some trusted certification
authority and therefore can be used for identification pur-
pose. We obtain M by concatenating the public keys of the
buyer and seller of the watermarked image. The seller calcu-
lates the hash of M to get H(M) and generates a watermark
that portrays H(M). The reason for using a cryptographic
hash function is that no matter how long isM, the hash out-
put will be compressed to 128 bits in case of MD5, or 160
bits in case of SHA1. For the purpose of illustration, suppose
we have a hash sequence H(M) = 0101010 . . . 10. The public
watermark for such a sequence is shown in Figure 2. The wa-
termark pattern can accommodate 256 bits of information.
The box in black represents a “0” while the box in white rep-
resents a “1.” In case the hash function used is MD5, the hash
output will be 128 bits. Since our watermark pattern can ac-
commodate 256 bits of information, the remaining blocks in
the watermark can be zero-padded or the hash pattern can
be tiled to cover the entire image area of the watermark. For
the sake of convenience, we use the public-watermark pat-
tern shown in Figure 2 in our discussion to follow. In our
experiments, a black pixel in Figure 2 is represented by a gray
value of zero, while a white pixel is represented by a gray value
of 255. We segment the public watermark into Wpub1 and
Wpub2 as shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively:
Wpub =Wpub1 +Wpub2. (7)
A third-level wavelet decomposition of the intermediate-
watermarked image I∗ is performed and the public
watermark is embedded in the LL subband. If the image I∗
is of dimension N ×N , then the size of the public watermark
will be (N/8 × N/8). As pointed out in [2], for a watermark
to be robust, it should be embedded in the perceptually most
significant components of the image spectrum. We embed
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Figure 3: Segment 1 of the public watermark.
Figure 4: Segment 2 of the public watermark.
the public watermark in the LL subband for increased ro-
bustness as the LL subband contains the most important in-
formation of an image. The embedding coeﬃcients should
however be carefully chosen keeping in view that for a par-
ticular value of the embedding coeﬃcient, the LL subband
is more susceptible to perceptual distortion as compared to
the other subbands. Let us denote the third-level LL subband
wavelet coeﬃcient of I∗ by YLL3. The following are the steps
for public-watermark embedding.
(1) Perform the third-level discrete wavelet decomposi-
tion of I∗. EmbedWpub1 andWpub2 separately in YLL3
to the following rules:
Ŷ1LL3 = YLL3 + α2 ·Wpub1, (8)
Ŷ2LL3 = YLL3 + α2 ·Wpub2, (9)
where α2 controls the watermark embedding strength
and Ŷ1LL3, Ŷ2LL3 are the modified LL subband wavelet
coeﬃcients after embedding the watermark.
(2) The watermarked image Iw is obtained by replacing
the YLL3 coeﬃcients of I∗ by the modified Ŷ1LL3 co-
eﬃcients and then taking the inverse discrete wavelet
transform. The inverse discrete wavelet transform
takes into account all the frequency subbands.
(3) Themodified wavelet coeﬃcients Ŷ2LL3 are then scaled
and rounded oﬀ into an n-bit integer to obtain the
public-watermark key Kw. The purpose of scaling
and rounding oﬀ is to compress the size of Kw. The
coeﬃcient of Ŷ2LL3 that has the minimum value is al-
waysmapped to zero while the coeﬃcient of Ŷ2LL3 that
has the maximum value is mapped to 2n. The remain-
ing coeﬃcients are linearly mapped between the values
zero and 2n using the equation of a straight line. The
Figure 5: Original image.
Figure 6: Intermediate watermarked image.
mapped wavelet coeﬃcients are then rounded oﬀ to
the nearest integer. For an 8-bit gray-level image hav-
ing 256× 256 pixels, there will be a total of 1024 Ŷ2LL3
coeﬃcients. By scaling and rounding oﬀ these coeﬃ-
cients to 8 bits, the size of Kw will be compressed to
1024 bytes. By choosing diﬀerent values of n, the size
of Kw can be controlled. We have experimentally ob-
served that scaling and rounding oﬀ to a 10-bit integer
gives good extraction results. In this case, the size of
Kw will be 1280 bytes.
Figure 5 shows the original cameraman image I , while
Figure 6 shows the intermediate-watermarked image I∗ ob-
tained by following the steps outlined in Section 3.1. Figures
7 and 8 show the watermarked image Iw and the correspond-




The public watermark is extracted from the watermarked im-
age using the public-watermark key Kw. Figure 9 shows the
block diagram of the public-watermark extraction. A third-
level discrete wavelet decomposition of the watermarked im-
age is first performed to get the LL subband coeﬃcients, Yw.
Note that the dimensions of Yw and Kw are the same. The
matrix Yw is a linear mixture of YLL3 and Wpub1 (8), while
the matrix Kw is a linear mixture of YLL3 and Wpub2 (9).
We therefore have a total of three sources YLL3, Wpub1, and
Wpub2 in the two mixtures Yw and Kw. To extract the pub-
lic watermark, we have used blind source separation as dis-
cussed in Section 2.3. We have used Cardoso’s JADE ICA al-
gorithm [21] for watermark extraction. The mixtures Yw and
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Figure 7: Watermarked image.
Figure 8: Public-watermark key.
Kw are treated as inputs to the blind source separation pro-
cess. Since we are using two mixtures, the BSS process will
give us two outputs, as shown in Figures 10 and 11. The first
output consists of a distorted version of YLL3. We call this as
the residue output. The second output consists of two parts.
The left half is similar to the left half of Wpub1 (Figure 3).
The right half is however exactly the opposite of the right
half ofWpub2 (Figure 4). This change in sign is because of the
sign ambiguity present in the ICA algorithm as discussed in
Section 2.3. By scaling the pixels values in Figure 11 to gray-
level range between 0 and 255 and flipping the right half, we
get the extracted watermark Ŵpub as shown in Figure 12.1
The binary pattern of the extracted watermark shown in
Figure 12 is similar to the watermark embedded (Figure 2).
In some cases, it might be required to flip the left half. Since
the seller of the watermarked image knows the exact pat-
tern of the public watermark, he/she can carry out BSS to see
which half of the extracted output shown in Figure 11 is re-
quired to be flipped. This information can then be conveyed
to the recipient. We have used ICA for watermark extraction
because of the scaling and rounding oﬀ as performed in step
1 The JADE algorithm that we have used in this paper is based on lin-
ear mixing model, fourth-order statistics, and noniterative approach. Al-
though this algorithm works well in the wavelet domain; like other BSS
algorithms, there are ambiguities present with this algorithm, like scaling
and sign change. Because of this reason, the hash bits of the right half
of the extracted public watermark (Figure 11) are toggled, that is, a bi-
nary “one” becomes “zero” and a binary “zero” becomes “one.” This will
therefore give an incorrect value of the hash. To compensate this problem,
the portion of the extracted output that has been inverted is flipped. Fur-
thermore, the left half of Figure 11 appears diﬀerent from the left half of
Figure 12. This is due to the high contrast between the left and the right

















Figure 9: Block diagram of public-watermark extraction.
Figure 10: Extracted output 1.
(3) of the public-watermark embedding. Because the Ŷ2LL3
coeﬃcients obtained from (9) are scaled and rounded oﬀ into
an n-bit integer, a simple subtraction of Yw and Kw will not
work.
4.2. Private-watermark extraction
The private-watermark extraction is nonblind and requires
the original image I . To extract the private watermark, the
DCT of the watermarked image Iw and the original image I
is taken and the watermark sequence is extracted from the









where w¯i is the extracted watermark sequence and z¯i are
the DCT coeﬃcients of Iw. The extracted watermark is then
compared with the original watermark using some similarity
measure. We use the normalized correlation coeﬃcient [1] as
our similarity measure. For our experiments, the values of α1
and α2 were chosen as 0.08 and 0.07, respectively. Since we
are using the normalized correlation coeﬃcient as our simi-
larity measure, the value of α1is not required to be known for
comparing the extracted watermark with the reference water-
mark.
It is important to note that the embedding of the public
watermark should not cause any significant degradation in
the private watermark. Interestingly, due to the robustness
property of the spread-spectrum watermarking technique,
the public watermark introduces a slight decrease in the
correlation value of the private watermark from 1.00 to
0.96. This interference can be further minimized by carefully
choosing the domain where both watermarks are embedded.
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Figure 11: Extracted output 2.
For example, if we embed the public watermark in the LH
or HL subband instead of the LL-subband, it will cause less
interference with the private watermark. However, there will
be a loss in robustness of the public watermark.
5. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS
Our proposed watermarking scheme consists of the follow-
ing protocols to deal with copyright protection issues:
(I) watermarked image generation and distribution pro-
tocol;
(II) buyer-seller identification protocol;
(III) copyright infringement protocol.
In Section 6, we discuss a fewmore protocols that can be used
for resolving ownership claims in case of multiple ownership
disputes.
5.1. Watermarked image generation and
distribution protocol
Suppose Alice wants to sell a watermarked image to Bob. This
protocol will enable Alice to acquire a watermark certificate
Cer from the CTA that contains a valid private watermark




B ) be the respective pub-
lic and private key pair of Bob. Figure 13 shows the flow dia-
gram of the watermarked image generation and distribution
protocol. The protocol proceeds as follows.
(1) Alice hashes her original image I to get H(I). She then
sends H(I), her public key K
pub
A , and certificate of her
identity to the CTA along with a request for issuing a
watermark.
(2) CTA verifies Alice’s identity. It then generates the pri-
vate watermark W
pri
A for Alice. The private watermark
is a pseudorandom noise sequence as described by (5).
(3) CTA calculates the hash H(W
pri
A ,H(I),T1). The
parameter T1 indicates the time stamp that is
used to resolve ownership disputes. CTA encrypts
H(W
pri
A ,H(I),T1) with its private key K
pri
C to get digi-

















(4) A tuple XA is formed as shown by (12). A digital signa-
ture SCA(XA,T1) is obtained by encrypting H(XA,T1)
Figure 12: Extracted public watermark.


































(6) Alice verifies CerA by first decrypting SCA(XA,T1) with
her private key and then further decrypting the re-
sult with CTA’s public key to get H(XA,T1). She then
hashes XA and T1 to get H(XA,T1). If H(XA,T1) =
H(XA,T1), it will be verified that CerA has been gener-
ated by the CTA and that it has not been tampered. Al-
ice then uses the watermark W
pri
A obtained from CerA
to generate the intermediate-watermarked image I∗A
using the steps outlined in Section 3.1.




B and uses the hash bits to gen-
erate the public watermark W
pub







A using (7). Using the steps
outlined in Section 3.2, she generates the watermarked
image IAw and the public-watermark keyKAw. She then








(8) Alice calculates H(W
pri
A ) and sends it along with IAw
and CKAw to Bob.3
(9) In this step, Bob will verify the genuine buyer-seller
transaction between him and Alice. Bob performs the
following steps.
(I) Decrypt CKAw with Alice’s public key to get KAw.
Using IAw and KAw, extract the public water-
mark Ŵ
pub
A according to the procedure outlined
in Section 4.1.
2 Instead of usingW
pri
A and its corresponding digital signature in CerA , the
CTA can also use a seed (that can be used with a secure publicly known
pseudorandom number generator) and its corresponding digital signa-
ture. This will save bandwidth. For further security, the CTA can also en-
crypt CerA with Alice’s public key and then transmit the encrypted ver-
sion of CerA to Alice.
3 Although not mentioned, the flipping information for postprocessing of
the public watermark will also be transmitted.
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Request for private watermark









B and compare the output of the




After performing step (I), Bob will only be success-
ful in extracting a genuine watermark pattern (like
the binary pattern shown in Figure 2), if the public-
watermark key has been encrypted with Alice’s private
key. This will also prove that the extracted watermark
has been embedded by Alice as no one else is supposed
to know Alice’s private key other than herself. Further-
more, if step (II) is successful, Bob will be convinced
that Ŵ
pub
A reflects his and Alice’s identities.

































A ) and stores CerA,




A ) as a record of
this transaction with Bob.4
5.2. Buyer-seller identification protocol
Suppose Alice makes a selling transaction with Bob as dis-
cussed in Section 5.1. The protocol discussed in this section
can be used by Bob or any other party to show that Bob is a
genuine buyer of the watermarked image IAw sold to him by
Alice. The protocol requires IAw and CKAw that Bob obtained
from Alice in the watermarked image generation and dis-
tribution protocol along with Alice’s and Bob’s public keys.
4 It is not necessary that Alice stores IAw as this will add an extra storage
overhead. Instead she can regenerate the watermarked image IAw when
required using step (7) of the watermarked image generation and distri-
bution protocol. This will require some extra storage requirements like
the watermark embedding strength parameters and any secret key used in
watermark embedding, and so forth. This storage however will be quite
less as compared to storing the entire watermarked image. In order to
make sure that the watermarked image regenerated in the future is 100%
similar to the one that was generated in the past, Alice can store the cryp-
tographic hash of IAw.
Figure 14 shows the block diagram of the proposed buyer-
seller identification protocol. The protocol proceeds as fol-
lows.








(2) Using IAw and KAw, extract the public watermark Ŵ
pub
A
according to the procedure outlined in Section 4.1.
(3) Hash the public keys of Alice and Bob to get HPub of
length L bits. For example, if the hash function used is










(4) Compare the binary bit sequence of HPub with the bit
pattern obtained from Ŵ
pub
A . If all the bits are com-
pared successfully, then it will be proved that Bob is
the legal buyer of IAw sold to him by Alice.
Remark 1. Is it possible for Bob to embed the binary se-
quence HPub in any arbitrary image J and then claim that
he is the legal buyer of J sold to him by Alice? It is easy for
Bob to generate the pattern HPub shown by (18) since it only
requires the knowledge of Alice’s and Bob’s public keys that
are available in the public domain. However, Bob cannot ob-
tain (15) (step (7) of the watermarked image generation and
distribution protocol), since it requires the knowledge of Al-
ice’s private key. If the correct private key of Alice is not used
in this step, then the result of decryption in step (1) of the
buyer-seller identification protocol will not be correct. As a
result, the extracted watermark will be gibberish. This shows
that it is not possible for Bob to insert the pattern HPub in
any arbitrary image J and then claim that he is the legal buyer
of J sold to him by Alice.
5.3. Copyright infringement protocol
Suppose Alice finds an illegal copy ÎAw of the watermarked
image IAw that she had previously sold to Bob. Using this
protocol, a judge can check whether ÎAw has originated from



























Figure 14: Block diagram of buyer-seller identification protocol.
the watermarked image IAw.5 Figure 15 shows the block di-
agram of this protocol. This protocol requires either one or
two stages to complete.
Stage 1. In this stage, the judge will follow the steps out-
lined in the buyer-seller identification protocol (Section 5.2)
to extract the public watermark Ŵ
pub
A from ÎAw using CKAw
(supplied by Alice from Bob’s transaction record). If the ex-
tracted watermark depicts Alice’s and Bob’s identities, then
Bob will be liable for copyright infringement. Bob can how-
ever be smarter. Since he knows the public watermark, he can
subtract its scaled version from ÎAw such that Ŵ
pub
A is not de-
tected in ÎAw. In such a case, Stage 2 of the protocol will be
used.
Stage 2. In this stage, the judge will extract an estimation of
the private watermark Ŵ
pri
A from ÎAw to check whether Bob
is guilty or not. In this stage, Alice will supply the judge with
IAw,W
pri




A ) from Bob’s transaction
record along with her original image I . The protocol pro-
ceeds as follows.
(1) Use Alice’s original image I to extract the private
watermark Ŵ
pri
A from ÎAw using the procedure outlined in
Section 4.2.
5 In this paper, we have not considered the case in which an unauthorized
copy of a watermarked image is distributed by a malicious seller or due












































A (supplied by Alice from her transaction
record for Bob) and K
pub









A ) = H(IAw,H(WpriA ),KpubA ),
it will be proved that Bob had purchased the watermar-
ked image IAw from Alice that contains the private water-
mark W
pri










A ) using Bob’s public key and that it contains Alice’s pub-
lic key as an argument.
(5) Bob will be considered guilty of copyright infringe-





A match with high correlation;
(ii) ÎAw and IAw match with high correlation.
Remark 2. If Alice has sold diﬀerent watermarked versions
of the same cover image to diﬀerent customers, how will she
identify the particular customer from whom an illegal copy
has originated? This taskmay become complicated, especially
if the number of clients grows huge. Before reporting the case
to the judge, Alice will first have to find out the identity of the
buyer from whom the illegal copy has originated. For exam-
ple, for each cover work, I1, I2, I3, and so on that she water-
marks and sells, she can maintain a separate database of all
the private watermarks that she has embedded into that par-
ticular cover work. Now if she finds, for example, an illegal
image I′, first she will sort out that for which cover work I′
belongs. This can be done by using a number of image pro-
cessing techniques that are available for eﬃcient and eﬀective
comparison of images. Once I′ is matched with a particu-
lar cover work, say I2, Alice will then narrow her search by
extracting the number of possible watermarks she has em-
bedded in I2 for diﬀerent clients. In case Alice uses the same
secret locations to embed private watermarks, she will have
to extract only a single watermark from I′. The extracted wa-
termark will then be compared with all the watermarks that
she has stored with respect to the cover work I2. The match
with the highest correlation will enable her to decide about
the buyer. After this she may report that particular buyer to
the judge.
6. RESOLVING MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP CLAIMS
In this section, we discuss problems that arise in case of mul-
tiple ownership claims over a watermarked image. In partic-
ular, we illustrate the following three attacks and show how
our proposed scheme can resist such attacks:
(I) multiple watermarked image attack;
(II) invertible watermark attack;
(III) watermark removal attack.






































Figure 15: Block diagram of copyright infringement protocol.
Throughout the discussion to follow, assume that Alice wa-
termarks her original image I using the private watermark
W
pri
A obtained from the CTA’s watermark certificate given by
(14) to get a watermarked image IAw.
6.1. Multiple watermarked image attack
Suppose Bob obtains a copy of IAw and further watermarks
it by using his private watermark W to get the watermarked
image IABw, for which he claims to be the legal owner. Resolv-
ing an ownership dispute between Alice and Bob over IABw is
quite straightforward if the watermarking technique is robust
[2, 22]. For example, in case of the spread-spectrum tech-
nique that we have used in this paper, both Alice’s and Bob’s
watermarks can be detected in the disputed image IABw. Bob
with his fake original IAw can show the presence of his wa-
termark W in IABw. However, he cannot show the presence
ofW in Alice’s original image I . Alice on the other hand can
show the presence of her watermark W
pri
A both in Bob’s fake
original IAw and as well as in the disputed image IABw. In this
way, Alice can prove her legal ownership of IABw. To show a
numerical example, we watermarked the cameraman image I
shown in Figure 5 with a PN sequenceW
pri
A to represent IAw.
We then watermarked IAw with another PN sequence W to
get another watermarked image that we represent byIABw. In
both cases, we kept the embedding strength of the watermark
α1 as 0.08. Using I as the original image, the watermarkW
pri
A
was detected in IAw and IABw with a normalized correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.998 and 0.691, respectively. Similarly, using
IAw as the original image, the watermark W was detected in
IABw with a normalized correlation coeﬃcient of 0.995. How-
ever, the normalized correlation coeﬃcient for W in I was
only −0.0316. These results confirm our above discussion.
6.2. Invertible watermark attack
The scenario depicted in Section 6.1 enables Alice to claim
her legal ownership because Bob cannot show the presence
of his watermark in Alice’s original image I . What if Bob is
able to show the presence of his fake watermark in Alice’s
original image? This might lead to an ownership deadlock. In
fact, Craver et al. [22] were the first to show such a scenario.
The attack proposed in [22] works for the decoding strategy
shown by (10) in which the extraction of the private water-
mark is nonblind. The idea is quite simple. In contrast to
what we showed in Section 6.1, Bob does something smarter.
Instead of embedding a watermark W in IAw, he subtracts
W from IAw to get an image I¯Aw which he calls his original.
Let us denote the watermark embedding and subtraction op-
erators by ⊕ and Θ, respectively. With this notation, Alice’s
watermarked image and Bob’s fake original are represented
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by (20) and (21), respectively:
IAw = I ⊕WpriA , (20)





In terms of IAw and I , (21) can be written as follows:
IAw = I¯Aw ⊕W ,
I = (I¯AwΘWpriA ⊕W).
(22)
From (22) we can see that by using his fake original I¯Aw, Bob
can show the presence of his watermark W both in Alice’s
watermarked version IAw and Alice’s original image I . Bob
can therefore accuse Alice that IAw and I are indeed his copies
of the watermarked image IAw. Similarly, Alice can also show
the presence of her watermark W
pri
A in both I¯Aw and IAw.
Craver et al. [22] have termed such a scheme as invertible,
which can actually lead to ownership deadlock. To solve this
problem, Craver et al. [22] suggested the following.
(i) Hash the original image I to generate a seed S.
(ii) The seed S is used by a fixed pseudorandom number
generator to generate the watermarkWs.
(iii) The watermarked image Iw = I ⊕Ws.
Now an attacker cannot generate a fake original because gen-
erating a fake original requires subtraction of a watermark
that is derived from the original itself. However, Ramku-
mar and Akansu have shown that this method is still invert-
ible [23]. Their proposed attack requires about 109 trials to
find the watermark for which the probability of error in wa-
termark detection is bounded by 10−9. This indicates that
the attack is computationally feasible. The authors in [23]
have also proposed some remedies to ensure noninvertibility.
With our proposed protocol, however, an invertible water-
mark attack does not seem possible because the watermarks
are issued by the CTA. Suppose Bob wants to create a fake
original I¯Aw by subtracting a watermark W from IAw. How-
ever, with our proposed scheme, Bob does not have the lib-
erty to choose W because the watermarks are issued by the





B from IAw to get I¯Aw and then claim I¯Aw to
be his fake original? To answer this question, refer to step (1)
of the watermarked image generation and distribution pro-
tocol. Before Bob can request for a private watermark from
the CTA, he is required to send the hash of his original im-
age to the CTA. Since Bob can only obtain his fake original
I¯Aw once he subtractsW
pri
B from IAw, he cannot perform step
(1) of the watermarked image generation and distribution
protocol.
We now examine the security of our scheme against in-
vertibility from another perspective. Bob calculates H(IAw)
and sends it to the CTA along with a request for a private wa-
termark. Suppose CTA generates a private watermark W
pri
B









































It is very realistic to assume that the time stamp T2 > T1,
since Bob can only send IAw after Alice generates IAw (using
CerA with the time stamp T1). If Bob subtracts W
pri
B from
IAw to get a fake original I¯Aw, can he accuse Alice in the court
of law that IAw and I are actually his copies of watermarked
image IAw? We now show a protocol that will prevent Bob
from claiming such false ownership. The protocol proceeds
as follows.
(1) Alice and Bob present their original images I and I¯Aw
along with their respective watermark certificates CerA and
CerB to the judge.
(2) The judge will check whether the identities of Alice
and Bob are associated with their respective watermark cer-
tificates CerA and CerB. In addition, the judge will also check
the authenticity and integrity of CerA and CerB. For example,
in case of Alice, the identity of Alice and the authenticity and
integrity of CerA are verified as follows.
(a) Alice will first decrypt SCA(XA,T1) with her private
key K
pri
A . The result is then further decrypted with the CTA’s
public key K
pub













Note 1. The CTA obtains SCA(XA,T1) in step (4) (Section
5.1) by first encryptingH(XA,T1) with CTA’s private key and
then with Alice’s public key. Therefore, SCA(XA,T1) has to
be first decrypted with Alice’s private key and then with the
CTA’s public key to get back H(XA,T1). However, in a real-
world scenario, Alice cannot release her private key to the
judge as this may compromise the security of the public key
cryptosystem. As an alternative, she can decrypt SCA(XA,T1)
with her private key and present the result to the judge. The
judge can then again encrypt this result with Alice’s public
key. If the judge is able to get back SCA(XA,T1), the judge will
be convinced that Alice has correctly performed the decryp-
tion. Using CTA’s public key, the judge then further decrypts
the decrypted result given by Alice to get H(XA,T1). This is
possible because in the RSA public key cryptosystem, which
we have used in this paper, if the public key is used for en-
cryption, then the corresponding private key is used for de-
cryption and vice versa.
(b) Retrieve XA from CerA and T1 from XA. Hash XA and
T1 to getH(XA,T1). IfH(XA,T1) = H(XA,T1), the following
will be proved:
(i) CerA has been assigned to Alice by the CTA;
(ii) SCA has been generated by the CTA at the instant T1
and it has not been tampered by Alice or any one
else.
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(3) The judge will then check whether the hash of Alice’s
and Bob’s supplied original images along with their respec-
tive private watermarks and time stamp provided in their wa-
termark certificates matches with CTA’s signatures.
























A and T1 from CerA and the origi-
nal image I supplied by Alice (step (1)), calculate the
hash H(W
pri
A ,H(I),T1). If H(W
pri
A ,H(I),T1) = H(WpriA ,
H(I),T1), the judge will be convinced that the image I
that Alice presented as her original is indeed the image
that was used by Alice to obtain the watermark certificate
CerA.
(4) The judge will also check the visual similarity/correla-
tion between I and IAw.
































B and T2 from CerB and the original
image I¯Aw supplied by Bob (step (1)), calculate the hash
H(W
pri
B ,H(I¯Aw),T2). It is interesting to note that Bob ob-
tained CerB using IAw. However, the fake original that
Bob has presented in step (1) is I¯Aw. Since H(IAw) =
H(I¯Aw), therefore H(W
pri
B ,H(I¯Aw),T2) = H(WpriB ,H(IAw),
T2). Therefore, Bob’s claim for false ownership will not be
successful.
To make the scheme invertible, Bob has to tweak the im-
age I¯Aw to get another image I˜Aw such that
(I) H(I˜Aw) = H(IAw);
(II) there should be a high visual similarity/correlation be-
tween IAw and I˜Aw.
Finding an image I˜Aw which satisfies condition (I) requires
breaking the security of the cryptographic hash function. In
case if the hash function used is SHA1, there are 2160 diﬀerent
combinations from which only one will satisfy condition (I).
This is computationally infeasible.
6.3. Watermark removal attack
Consider a scenario in which Bob performs some operation
on Alice’s watermarked image IAw to get another image Î such
that the strength of Alice’s watermark W
pri
A in Î is signifi-
cantly reduced to an extent thatW
pri
A is rendered undetected
in Î . Next Bob sends H(Î) to the CTA along with a request










































Again, it is realistic to assume that the time stamp T2 > T1,
since Bob can only obtain Î after Alice generates IAw (using
CerA with the time stamp T1). Bob watermarks Î with W
pri
B
to get a watermarked image ÎBw. If Alice accuses Bob that ÎBw
originated from IAw, can Bob prove his fake ownership of ÎBw?
Despite the fact that W
pri
A cannot be detected in ÎBw, we will
show a protocol that will prevent Bob from his false claim.
For this protocol to work, Alice should have a copy of her
watermarked image IAw. We now outline the main steps of
this protocol.
(1) Alice and Bob present their original images I and Î
along with their respective watermark certificates CerA
and CerB to the judge.
(2) As discussed in step (2) (Section 6.2), the judge will
check whether the identities of Alice and Bob are asso-
ciated with their respective watermark certificates CerA
and CerB. The judge will then check the authenticity
and integrity of CerA and CerB. In addition, the judge
will also check whether the hash of Alice’s and Bob’s
supplied original images along with their respective
private watermarks and time stamp provided in their
watermark certificates matches with the CTA’s signa-
tures.
(3) The judge will then check the visual similarity be-
tween I , IAw and Î , ÎBw. Since the underlying water-
marking scheme is invisible, there should be a very
high visual similarity/correlation between the original
image and its watermarked version. For a particular
claimant, if visual similarity/correlation is not found
between the original image and its watermarked ver-
sion, then that person will not be considered as a can-
didate for true ownership. It should be noted that for
Alice’s claim to be true, there should be a high visual
similarity/correlation between ÎBw and IAw.
(4) The judge will then check for the presence of Alice’s





respective watermarked images IAw and ÎBw.
(5) In our specific illustration,W
pri
A will be detected in IAw
with a high correlation. Similarly W
pri
B will also be de-
tected in ÎBw with a high correlation. The judge will
then decide about the actual owner by looking at the
time stamp in Alice’s and Bob’s watermark certificates.
Since Alice got CerA before Bob, therefore T1 < T2. As
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a result, Alice will be considered the true owner and
Bob will fail to prove his false claim of ownership.
7. CONCLUSION
A watermarking algorithm alone cannot completely address
the complex issues involved in copyright protection. For a re-
liable and secure watermarking scheme, it is necessary that
the watermarking algorithm being used is well integrated
with a secure protocol. In this paper, we have proposed a se-
cure watermarking scheme that is aimed at addressing some
of the important issues in copyright protection. Specifically,
we have focused on three issues of copyright protection, that
is, buyer-seller identification, copyright infringement, and
verification of ownership. By buyer-seller identification, we
mean that a successful watermark extraction at the buyer’s
end will reveal the identities of the buyer and seller of a wa-
termarked image. In case of copyright infringement, our pro-
posed scheme will enable the seller to identify the specific
buyer from whom an illegal copy of a watermarked image
has originated and further prove this fact to a third party. By
verification of ownership, we mean that the seller of the wa-
termarked image should be able to prove his or her genuine
ownership in case of multiple ownership claims.
In conventional watermarking schemes, the seller of a
watermarked image embeds some information, for exam-
ple, a logo, in a cover image to associate his/her ownership
with the image. But the question which arises is that how can
we associate some kind of information (i.e., a watermark)
with a particular person? To resolve this issue, there has to
be some legal binding of the extracted watermark with the
identity of the person who claims to be the buyer/seller of
the watermarked image. We have addressed this issue by as-
sociating the identities of the buyer/seller with their respec-
tive public-private key pairs. In a real-world situation, pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI) provides a framework in which
a public-private key pair is associated with the identity of a
person, for example, by issuing digital certificates [14]. With
this idea in mind, we have devised a secure watermarking
scheme that uses public-private keys and digital signatures to
bind the identities of the buyer/seller with the watermarked
image. Using public-private keys and digital signatures, our
scheme enables a buyer to prove that he/she has legally pur-
chased a watermarked image from a specific seller. In case
of copyright infringement, the cryptographic primitives al-
low a seller to identify the specific buyer from whom an ille-
gal copy has originated and further prove this fact to a third
party. Issues pertaining to multiple ownership claims have
also been addressed by using watermarks and their respective
time-stamped digital signatures issued from a trusted certifi-
cation authority. The security analysis shown in the appendix
demonstrates the security of our scheme against tampering
of the original image, the time stamp, or the watermarks.
The cryptographic security of the hash function and the RSA
public key cryptosystem ensure the security of our proposed
watermarking scheme against such attacks.
Although the spread-spectrum technique which we have
used for embedding the private watermark is quite robust,
however, it is a nonblind technique. For example, in case of
copyright infringement and ownership verification, the legal
seller is required to produce the original image to resolve the
ownership dispute. This may not be desirable in some appli-
cations as it potentially leaks the secrecy of the original unwa-
termarked image. Using a blind watermarking technique for
private-watermark extraction seems a good solution. How-
ever, issues related to ambiguity in dispute resolving or own-
ership deadlocks due to weaknesses in watermarking algo-




In this appendix, we present the security analysis of our pro-
posed scheme against tampering of the watermark certificate
or the original image. We introduce an attack called the time
stamp attack and show that our scheme can resist such an at-
tack. In addition, we will also show that it is computationally
infeasible for an attacker to modify or tamper the contents
of the watermark certificate or the original image. As dis-
cussed in Section 6.3, in case of watermark removal attack,
the true seller will be identified by looking at the CTA’s time
stamp provided in the watermark certificate. Consider again
the scenario discussed in Section 6.3. A question that arises
is whether it is possible for Bob to watermark Alice’s water-
marked image IAw using a watermark obtained from the CTA
at time T0 (T0 < T1). If Bob somehow manages to launch
this attack, he will be considered as the true seller in case of
an ownership dispute with Alice. We call this attack as the
time stamp attack (TSA), and show that our proposed set of
copyright protocols can prevent Bob from launching such an
attack. To demonstrate this fact, assume that for some im-
age J that Bob possesses, CTA issues a watermark certificate





































Suppose, later in time, Alice watermarks her original image
I using the private watermark W
pri
A obtained from the CTA’s
watermark certificate CerA given by (14) to generate a wa-
termarked image IAw. Let us assume that Bob gets a copy of
Alice’s watermarked image IAw, and some how removesW
pri
A
from IAw to get another image Î . He then watermarks Î us-
ing the private watermark W
pri
B0 obtained from CerB0 to get
a watermarked image IBw0. Now suppose there is an own-
ership dispute between Alice and Bob over the image IBw0.
Alice accuses Bob that IBw0 originated from IAw. The ques-
tion that arises is whether Bob can prove his fake ownership.
The protocol discussed in Section 6.3 can be used to decide
about the actual seller of IBw0. As discussed in Section 6.3,
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before checking the presence of Alice’s and Bob’s private wa-
termarks in the respective watermarked images IAw and IBw0,
the judge will check the following:
(I) association of Alice and Bob with their respective wa-
termark certificates;
(II) authenticity and integrity of CerA and CerB0;
(III) the perceptual similarity/correlation between (I , IAw),
(Î , ÎBwo), and (IAw and ÎBwo);
(IV) the authenticity and integrity of the claimant’s sup-
plied original image and its respective digital signature
by the CTA in the watermark certificate.
Theorem A.1. To prove his fake ownership of IBw0, Bob has to
find a fake original image P such that the following conditions
are satisfied.
(I) The image P should be visually similar to IBw0, that
is, the normalized correlation coeﬃcient between P and
IBw0 should approach unity.
(II) The fake original image P, the watermark, and the







) = H(WpriB0 ,H(J),T0
)
. (A.4)
Proof. As discussed in Section 6.3, in case of Bob, the judge
will check the perceptual similarity/correlation between IBw0
and the image that Bob will present to the judge as his orig-
inal. Since Bob has obtained his watermark certificate CerB0
before he had the knowledge of IAw, it is reasonable to assume
that the original image J that Bob had used to get CerB0 will
be diﬀerent from IAw. Therefore, Bob has to fool the judge
by presenting a fake image P that is visually similar to IBw0
instead of J . This proves condition (I). We now prove con-
dition (II) by proving (A.4). Since Bob had provided H(J)
















During the ownership verification protocol discussed in


















To keep the CTA’s digital signature intact, Bob’s fake original
P should satisfy (A.4).
Corollary A.1. It is computationally infeasible for Bob to find
an image P that satisfies (A.4).
Proof. Oneway that Bobmay use to start finding a fake image
P is to make small changes in IBw0 until (A.4) is satisfied. The
changes made in IBw0 should be such that P is visually sim-
ilar to IBw0. However, for Bob to be successful, he has to try
all unique combinations of the hash functions before he can
get one that satisfies (A.4). In addition, the changes that Bob
makes to get P from IBw0 should still keep a high visual sim-
ilarity/correlation between P and IBw0. Finding an image P
that satisfies (A.4) requires breaking the security of the cryp-
tographic hash function. In case the hash function used is
SHA1, there are 2160 diﬀerent combinations from which only
one will satisfy (A.4). This is computationally infeasible to do
so.
Remark A.1. Let us assume a hypothetical scenario in which
Bob is successful in finding a fake original P that satisfies
(A.4). However, to generate an authentic watermark certifi-
cate, Bob will have to forge the digital signature of the CTA
to generate the second element of the watermark certificate.
This is computationally infeasible as it implies breaking the
RSA public key cryptosystem. Therefore, the cryptographic
security of the hash function and the RSA cryptosystem en-
sures the security of our proposed watermarking protocols
against TSA and any other attack that involves any modifi-
cation or fake insertion of the original image (whose hash
was presented to the CTA for obtaining the watermark cer-
tificate) or the private watermark present in the watermark
certificate.
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